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I. INTRODUCTION

We missed it. Like a slowly growing river as the snow melts in the hills, it grew
from a trickle to a tide. Justice Alito was the author of the Opinion of the Court in
Koontz v. St. John River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592, 186 L.
Ed. 2d 697 (2013). Alito’s opinion represented a 5–4 split on the Supreme Court.
This was interesting because the last two major water-related cases were
unanimous—Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012), and Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission v. U.S., 133 S. Ct. (2012). Then came the Koontz opinion. Koontz was
decided on June 25, 2013. At the time, I was working on an article on Sackett v.
EPA.1 It was immediately apparent that Koontz was a significant decision. I also was
immediately reminded of the concurrences that both Justices Ginsburg and Alito
wrote in Sackett.
* Mr. Maguire is an attorney at the firm of Loomis, Ewert, Parsley, Davis & Gotting, P.C.
in Lansing, Michigan. He specializes in real estate, land use, municipal, and administrative
law. He is Vice Chairman of the City of Lansing Planning Board. He received his J.D. from
The Thomas M. Cooley Law School. He received his B.A. in Political Science from Kenyon
College. This article is dedicated to the author's grandfather - William A. Lawko, Esq. A firstgeneration American, Mr. Lawko received his undergraduate degree from Cleveland State
(then Fenn College) right as America entered into World War II. He enlisted in the Army
though he was already drafted so that he could receive his diploma. He served honorably in
the South Pacific theater. After returning to Cleveland, he attended night school at the
recently-merged Cleveland-Marshall Law School. He was admitted to the Ohio Bar in 1950.
He retired from active practice after over 60 years and closed his office on West 117th Street.
He lives and instills the ethics of hard work and fighting for your freedom. Mr. Lawko is a
living treasure, a wealth of knowledge, and reminder of what makes this country great. He is
also a loving father, grandfather, and great-grandfather. The author owes him more and loves
him more than can be put into words.
1

Colin W. Maguire, Sackett v. EPA Six Months Out: A Wide-Ranging Effect with an
Uncertain Significance, 30 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 59 (2013).
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In Sackett, Justice Ginsburg emphasized judicial restraint in addressing the
overzealous actions of a government agency.2 Indeed, the Justices unanimously
agreed that the EPA’s actions amounted to nothing more than unreasonable “strongarming” on behalf of the government.3 Justice’s Alito’s concurrence did not exercise
such restraint. He argued that 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA)
allowed for such government behavior because “[t]he position taken in this case by
the Federal Government—a position that the Court now squarely rejects—would
have put the property rights of ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) employees.”4
With those viewpoints in mind when it comes to water and wetland issues, two
significant cases came before the Court shortly after Sackett. Justice Ginsburg
authored the unanimous Opinion of the Court in a case brought on behalf of the State
of Arkansas.5 Arkansas claimed that temporary flooding of state lands by the federal
government was a taking. Without determining whether a taking occurred or looking
to Arkansas law, the Court limited its ruling to the proposition “that governmentinduced flooding temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption from Takings
Clause inspection.”6 Justice Ginsburg specifically looked to the case-by-case
approach affirmed in Tahoe-Sierra and championed by Justice Stevens.7
This set the stage for Koontz. With Justice Alito writing the Opinion, the Court
announced two holdings. First, government coercion in the form of conditional
permits for filling wetlands does not “evade the limitations of Nollan8 and Dolan9”
and could equate to a taking.10 Second, the monetary exactions required by
government entities must meet the nexus and rough proportionality requirements of
Nollan and Dolan.11
What does this case mean for takings law? How did the Court come to extend the
breadth of takings? Is this another blow to wetlands protection—a troubled and
questioned area of the law in recent times through decisions like Sackett and
Rapanos?12 The Opinion in Koontz has deep meaning, but it should not lessen the
importance of water resource sustainability. This analysis will attempt to show that
the environmental aspect of these cases is often incidental to the majority of the
Court. This makes the impact no less real, but Koontz also may force us as a country
to embrace environmental impact. This analysis will first focus on sustainable water
2

Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374-75 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

3

Id. at 1374.

4

Id. at 1375.

5

Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).

6

Id. at 522.

7

Id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 342, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
8

Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).

9

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).

10

Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595-96 (2013).

11

Id. at 2599.

12

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006).
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resource policies—including the CWA—as a conduit for aggressive government
action towards property owners. Indeed, the principal reason for disagreement
among the “liberal” and “conservative” factions of the Court appears to focus on the
motivations of government administrators—starting with Rapanos. Second, the
Opinion of the Court in Tahoe-Sierra, as authored by then-Justice Stevens, created a
strong divergence between takings inquiries based upon (1) government policies or
(2) the land use of individual parcels—again, to create breathing room for
government administrators in a case regarding water quality sustainability. Third, the
analysis will examine a recent trend of bold government regulations imposed against
property owners, and how resilient property owners have taken government
administrators to the Supreme Court—with impressive results. Finally, this analysis
will focus on how Justice Alito authored Koontz to set the tone on takings law in this
era.
In the end, both Justice Alito and Justice Ginsburg had the foresight to
understand the growing tension between property rights and government regulation
of water resources in Sackett. Justice Ginsburg pled restraint, and exercised that
restraint in Arkansas Fish & Game to address a policy creating a takings issue.
Justice Alito took the next step and brought about a sort of backlash to Tahoe-Sierra.
He was able to place individual parcel wetlands issues in the camp of Nollan and
Dolan. It is no accident that the nexus standard in Dolan is so similar to the nexus
standard in Rapanos, and now they are connected. In the cases leading up to Koontz,
the Court surprisingly appeared to agree that government actors were exercising
heavy-handed decisions in dealing with water and wetlands issues on property. This
administrative attitude could have found some justification in Justice Stevens’ voice
on takings issues in the preceding years. But Justice Ginsburg saw the problem with
contemporary developments in water resource regulation and takings law. That
problem created an opportunity which Justice Alito appears to have capitalized on.
II. CLEAN WATER OFTEN LEADS TO AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS
Significant sections of land in, around, and near oceans, lakes, and rivers are
subject to the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7); this
section of law states that the CWA applies to “‘navigable waters’ which means the
waters of the United States.” The EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have a
substantial definition of what a wetland is based upon what the term “waters of the
United States” means, especially in their own interpretation of the CWA.13 But the
breadth of this definition, as applied, was tackled head on by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Rapanos, and added a layer of analysis to the government’s
definition:
[F]irst, that the adjacent channel contains a “wate[r] of the United States,”
(i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional
interstate navigable waters); and second, that the wetland has a continuous
surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine where
the “water” ends and the “wetland” begins.14

13

33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2013).

14

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742.
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This means a government entity must show a “significant nexus” between the land
and the “waters of the United States.”15 This language was the hallmark of the
Rapanos Opinion.
But the reasoning behind the Rapanos Opinion is couched in expansive
administrative attitudes regarding jurisdiction on behalf of the EPA and Army Corps
of Engineers. The Court noted that, unlike the jurisdiction under the CWA to protect
against filling wetlands, the jurisdiction for directly polluting water extended to any
source.16 Therefore, the Court felt it was a stretch for the government to argue that
pollutants such as effluents would pollute water if the jurisdiction under the CWA
was limited because other legislation addressed this concern.17
The Court’s concern in Rapanos was caused by cases like U.S. v. Deaton—a
2003 Fourth Circuit decision which illustrates a common example of how a private
developer may run afoul of the CWA.18 In that case, a developer dug a drainage ditch
in Maryland in order build a subdivision because an existing drainage ditch
insufficiently drained the property.19 That existing ditch drained into another ditch,
and then a stream, and then a river, and then the Chesapeake Bay—a trip of 32
miles.20 After dirt was placed near the ditch, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers filed
a civil suit against the property owner claiming that this was an unlawful discharge
of pollutants into the existing ditch—a wetland—in violation of CWA 33 U.S.C. §
1344(a) and 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(5).21 Therefore, violators get fined twice as
much—$65,000.00 per day as opposed to $32,500.00 per day for violating a law and
a federal rule.22 Prior to Rapanos, CWA jurisdiction required only a hydrologic
connection between the wetlands and navigable waters.23 This allowed for
government action like that in Deaton.
As the conservative elements of the Court pointed out in Rapanos, government
actors were focusing on the CWA and its language of wetlands “adjacent to
navigable bodies of water and their tributaries,” and then taking the term “adjacent”
and deciding that it “may be interpreted who-knows-how broadly.”24 The Court then
chastised the dissent—composed of the more liberal faction of the Court, stating:
It is not clear why roughly defined physical proximity should make such a
difference—without actual abutment, it raises no boundary-drawing
ambiguity, and it is undoubtedly a poor proxy for ecological significance.
In fact, though the dissent is careful to restrict its discussion to wetlands
15

Id.

16

Id. at 743.

17

Id.

18

U.S. v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003).

19

Id. at 702.

20

Id.

21

Id. at 702–3.

22

Clean Water Act: Penalties, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region6/6en/w/cwa.htm (last
visited Mar. 31, 2015).
23

Deaton, 332 F.3d at 712.

24

Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 748 (2006).
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“adjacent” to tributaries, its reasons for including those wetlands are
strictly ecological—such wetlands would be included because they “serve
. . . important water quality roles” and “play important roles in the
watershed . . . .” This reasoning would swiftly overwhelm SWANCC
altogether; after all, the ponds at issue in SWANCC could, no less than
the wetlands in these cases, “offer ‘nesting, spawning, rearing and resting
sites for aquatic or land species,’” and “‘serve as valuable storage areas
for storm and flood waters.’”25
Again, the liberal faction of the Court cautioned restraint in interpreting the actions
of government actors encumbering land through water quality efforts.
The dissent looked to broad policy and a good faith belief that the government
was doing the right thing in encumbering a private property owner. The majority of
the Court did not share this thought-process at all, instead looking to the potential for
government abuse of power:
The dissent’s exclusive focus on ecological factors, combined with its
total deference to the Corps’ ecological judgments, would permit the
Corps to regulate the entire country as “waters of the United States.”26
Interestingly, there are serious questions as to whether protecting wetlands the way
wetlands are protected under the CWA is even effective. This imprecise regulation
has caused many observers, and possibly even liberal Justices on the Supreme Court,
to question the necessity of the government attitudes toward wetlands protection.27
In fact, there is significant evidence which suggests that the CWA is extremely
inefficient in providing ecological benefit, especially compared to the Clean Air
Act.28 For instance, large parking lots are perceived as water run-off and pollution
nightmares under the water sustainability principles; but they can also create a “park
once” mentality in community members which leads to a reduction in overall carbon
emissions.29 Plus, stormwater run-off from parking areas is manageable through
water diversion techniques like the use of bioswales and permeable water detention
areas.30
But there is even criticism of the ecological value of wetlands mitigation—the
policy used in Koontz—because many developed parcels have greater ecological
value than the parcel substituted in mitigation.31 Others, particularly property rights
advocates, have argued that there is a more subjective purpose in what is over25

Id. at 748–49 (internal citations omitted).

26

Id. at 749.

27

Richard A. Epstein, Modern Environmentalists Overreach: A Plea for Understanding
Background Common Law Principles, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 38 (2014).
28 Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L.
REV. 21, 33 (2001) (citing J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE
UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 101–35, 147–48 (1998)).
29

DEAN M. FRIEDERS, FOUNDATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LAW, REGULATION,
AND PLANNING 48–50 (ABA 2012).
30

Id. at 79.

31

Stewart, supra note 28, at 76.
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regulation masquerading as water resources protection. Indeed, the presence of a
wetland and government interest can “bring chills to developers’ spines.”32 In this
sense, it is not surprising that the most significant takings case of the 2000–2010
decade involved the protection of water resources from private development.
III. TAHOE-SIERRA CREATED A CLEAR DIVERGENCE OF TAKINGS LAW IN THE HOPE
THAT WATER RESOURCE REGULATION WAS TRENDING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
Justice Stevens wrote the Opinion of the Court in Tahoe-Sierra. Justice Stevens
wrote the Tahoe-Sierra Opinion not many years after writing the infamous Kelo
decision. What is critical to note is that, prior to Justice Alito’s arrival, Justice
Stevens held the ear of the Court (particularly Justice Kennedy) on land use issues.
This is not surprising given his background. Justice Stevens’ family was part of the
prominent Chicago landowning and business elite in the early part of the 20th
Century.33 Justice Stevens’ education on the campus of the University of Chicago
ultimately made him a brilliant, constant experimenter with norms and judicial
policy.34 But he also saw his family’s amassing of property wealth, followed by the
Great Depression and the government taking his family’s businesses and properties
into receivership.35 How this life experience impacted his decisions is unclear, but he
certainly wrote Kelo and Tahoe Sierra—two takings cases with very different factual
basis—from a unique perspective: a liberal jurist and the son of a staunch
Republican businessman who lost everything to the government when times were
hard.
Tahoe-Sierra involved a series of moratoria on any development along scenic
Lake Tahoe. Were these moratoria takings, and was that really the issue the Court
looked at?36 The initial focus of Justice Stevens’ analysis was on the unique beauty
and ecological character of Lake Tahoe.37 The water of Lake Tahoe was among the
clearest in the world.38 It was undisputed that, in this particular case, significant
development around Lake Tahoe over 40 years negatively impacted the quality of
the water.39 However, it was also undisputed that the property value of the
undeveloped land around Lake Tahoe was significantly impacted due to the
government moratoria on development.40
Of critical importance to the Court, was the fact that the landowners banded
together in a single entity to challenge the nature of the government moratorium

32

FRIEDERS, supra note 29, at 112.

33

BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE 21–
25 (2010).
34

Id. at 27.

35

Id. at 31.

36

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
306–07 (2002).
37

Id. at 307.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 308.

40

Id. at 309.
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policy—arguing that the policy created a categorical temporary taking.41 Because it
was agreed that the total economic loss of the singular parcels had occurred for a
period of time, the landowners wanted the Court to apply the rule in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The rule in Lucas, which is
tied to Nollan,42 states that an owner of a particular parcel suffers a taking when all
of the owner’s economic use is idle.43
Combining this rule with the possibility of a temporary taking was possible
through the Court’s decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). While Justice Stevens
agreed that First English was significant, the Court opined that First English was
about policy and not about whether a taking actually occurred.44 Justice Stevens
announced two completely distinct tracks for a takings analysis.
Justice Stevens agreed that all takings cases originate from Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Penn Coal, Justice Holmes announced the
rule that “if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”45 Justice
Stevens also recognized the long-standing “whole parcel theory” from Justice
Brandeis’ dissent.46 Justice Stevens reasoned that this meant that regulatory takings
and physical invasions of property were distinct takings categories. Regulatory
takings address the actions of a government in creating a policy which leads to a
taking or series of takings. Physical invasions of property address a particular
government body’s intrusion with a particular parcel of land.47
Therefore, Justice Stevens looked to Penn Central Transportation Company v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) and First English as examples where the full
taking of the individual parcel was not an issue for the Court. Justice Stevens
reasoned that the only issues in those cases involved whether the regulation “went
too far”—as opposed to whether the “whole parcel” lost value.48 Conversely, Justice
Stevens reasoned that Lucas involved the “valueless” nature of a single parcel where
a taking was declared at the trial court level.49 The rule in Lucas involved the loss of
“all economically beneficial use” to the whole parcel.50
This caused Justice Stevens to find Lucas completely inapplicable to the facts in
Tahoe-Sierra—particularly because there were no fact-issues in the case involving
individual parcels.51 Instead, he applied the Penn Central factor analysis for a

41

Id. at 323–24.

42

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).

43

Id. at 1019.

44

Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 328 (citing First English, 482 U.S. at 311).

45

Id. at 326 (quoting Penn Coal, 260 U.S. at 415).

46

Id. at 326, n.22 (citing Penn Coal, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).

47

Id. at 326–28.

48

Id. at 326–29.

49

Id. at 329.

50

Id. at 329–30

51

Id. at 330–31.
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regulatory taking.52 But why abrogate Penn Coal into two rules when applying the
rule in Lucas to regulatory takings could create an incredibly high burden for
impacted property owners? Fascinatingly, Justice Stevens stated significant concerns
regarding the decisions of government administrators across the board.53 He noted
that First English addressed the issue of local governments taking the time to
administer land use issues without running afoul of takings issues.54 Justice Stevens
again cited the natural delay in the administrative process to create proper land use
guidelines in order to sustain Lake Tahoe’s ecological value. Justice Stevens opined
that this is a well-reasoned principle which should apply broadly.55 This was
consistent with Justice Stevens’ extensive dissent in First English which
passionately argued that a government body’s administrative actions deserve
significant deference in a regulatory takings analysis.56
Sitting in the Supreme Court in 2002, deciding Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Stevens’
argument makes a great deal of sense. First, there was not a lot of sympathy for
multi-millionaire retirees who wanted to build their dream mansions at the expense
of turning brown and muddy one of the most pristine lakes in the world.
Furthermore, the “go green” movement was starting to gain mainstream popularity
when significant programs like LEED® were unveiled in 2000.57 As evidenced in
the facts of Tahoe-Sierra, Rapanos, and even in circuit decisions like Deaton,
government regulators from the federal to local level were emboldened during this
time period to aggressively regulate water quality. As Justice Stevens indicated,
Tahoe-Sierra may have turned out differently if individual landowners came forward
as they had in Nollan and Penn Coal.58
By stating that only individuals can challenge per se takings while groups must
challenge policy-based takings, Justice Stevens successfully added a layer of cost
and litigation to one who seeks to accuse the government of taking his land. Justice
Stevens is not only siding with regulators, but also betting that the regulators will not
abuse their power and only target major sustainability projects. After all, a 32-month
moratorium on development for dozens of landowners is patently absurd—unless
applied to the rights facts. Justice Stevens’ distinction was clearly a decision based
upon previous Opinions, but there was a risk associated with it. The risk was that
government administrators would not act with unreasonable aggression in response.
If they did, the Court might well make it far easier for individual property owners to
assert a taking. That risk was realized in Sackett.

52

Id. at 331.

53

Id. at 329.

54

Id. (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321
(1987)).
55

Id. at 339.

56

First English, 482 U.S. at 329–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

57

U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/about/history.

58

Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332.
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IV. SACKETT: UNREASONABLE BEHAVIOR FOR THE SAKE OF WATER AND JUSTICE
ALITO’S DISCONTENT
In retrospect, the decision in Sackett was foreseeable. The Opinion, in part, reads
like a scolding from a unanimous Court. As previously referenced, the years
preceding 2007 saw a mix of emboldened government water quality administrators,
a highly-subjective attitude of administrators regarding rules and procedures, and a
questioning of the effectiveness of wetlands protection in certain cases. Sackett
involved one legal fact-issue for resolution: whether the EPA had jurisdiction over
the Sacketts’ property.
In 2007, Mr. & Mrs. Sackett were building their home on a parcel of land near
Priest Lake in Idaho. However, several lots separated the parcel from the lake.59 The
Sacketts filled their small lot with dirt for construction of their home.60 Priest Lake is
a navigable water of the United States as defined under the CWA 33 U.S.C. §
1362(7).61 However, the EPA found the Sacketts’ property was an “adjacent”
wetland to Priest Lake and issued a compliance order against the Sacketts alleging
they violated the CWA when they filled in a protected wetland.62 The EPA
implemented a potential $75,000 fine for each day the Sacketts failed to comply with
its order.63
Worse, the EPA declined to hold a hearing on the issue because 33 U.S.C. §
1319(a), unlike 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) and (g), did not explicitly provide for any kind
of review.64 The EPA’s position that compliance orders under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)
were precluded from pre-enforcement judicial review, as opposed to the definition of
a wetland under the CWA as applied to the Sacketts’ property, fueled the litigation to
come. In no uncertain terms, the position of the EPA was “comply so that you can
appeal, or pay $75,000 per day.”
The tactics and attitudes of the EPA did not go over well with the Supreme
Court. A unanimous Court used the term “strong-arming” and derided the idea that
the EPA could claim it achieved “voluntary compliance” with such tactics.65 But the
EPA appeared undeterred, with an EPA official stating that it was “business as
usual” after Sackett.66 The attitude of the government administrators in the case led
to two completely different concurrences.
Justice Ginsberg first wrote a concurrence which, by itself, read in an almost
counterintuitive manner. In part, she wrote:
The Court holds that the Sacketts may immediately litigate their
jurisdictional challenge in federal court. I agree, for the Agency has ruled
definitively on that question. Whether the Sacketts could challenge not
59

Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370–71 (2012).

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Maguire, supra note 1, at 63–64.

65

Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1367, 1374.

66

Maguire, supra note 1, at 69.
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only the EPA's authority to regulate their land under the Clean Water Act,
but also, at this pre-enforcement stage, the terms and conditions of the
compliance order, is a question today's opinion does not reach out to
resolve. Not raised by the Sacketts here, the question remains open for
another day and case. On that understanding, I join the Court's opinion.67
Here is the odd part: the Sacketts were fighting for the ability to challenge the
regulatory actions of the EPA—whereas the EPA argued this challenge was not yet
ripe. But a challenge to the EPA’s authority in this case was inherently a challenge
of the conditions and penalties. The penalties for not complying with the EPA’s rules
were automatic once jurisdiction was established. Justice Alito, as referenced below,
appeared to understand the significant issue which was dodged in Sackett—the
breadth of the EPA’s jurisdiction under the CWA. To Justice Alito, there was no
tangible distinction between the jurisdiction of the CWA and the aggressive tactics
of individual water quality regulators.
Again, the reason for Justice Ginsburg’s short, seemingly out of place
concurrence, rests with a concern for the power of water a quality administrator to
regulate water quality. It was beyond argument that the EPA administrators in this
case “strong armed” the Sacketts through the use of jurisdictional keep away. But
Justice Ginsburg expresses concern for the value of water quality regulation as a
whole—as though the facts in Sackett were an isolated incident. However, it was
well-established that this behavior was nothing more than the typical process of the
EPA.68
That was right where Justice Alito picked up his concurrence. It is worth taking a
moment to consider perceptions regarding Justice Alito and his positions on the
Court. At the time of Justice Alito’s confirmation hearings, he was considered a
strong conservative nominee with support from leading neocons in the Bush
Administration.69 Indeed, observers such as Professor Cass Sunstein researched
Justice Alito’s dissents before joining the Supreme Court and found that Justice
Alito was against “individual rights” in 84% of cases—many times on panels with
all Republican-appointed Judges.70 Therefore, one might not pick Justice Alito as a
coalition-builder. Indeed, his concurrence in Sackett advocates a step further than the
unanimous Court is willing to go. But Justice Alito was also setting the stage for a
future agreement among five of the Justices.
In his concurrence, Justice Alito’s distaste for the EPA’s position was apparent in
the opening line of this concurrence:
The position taken in this case by the Federal Government—a position
that the Court now squarely rejects—would have put the property rights

67

Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374–75 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).

68 Maguire, supra note 1, at 62 (citing Sackett v. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir.
2010)).
69
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BLOC 24 (2008).
70

Id. at 25–6.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss4/6

10

2015]

ALITO’S VOICE

787

of ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) employees.71
Justice Alito then decried the CWA as “notoriously unclear.”72 He noted that almost
any piece of land that is wet for part of the year “is in danger of being classified by
EPA employees as wetlands covered by the [CWA].”73 Again, the focus was on the
decisions of administrators charged with water quality management.
Next Justice Alito engaged in an analysis that should appear familiar to those
who have read his Opinion in Koontz:
The EPA may issue a compliance order demanding that the owners cease
construction, engage in expensive remedial measures, and abandon any
use of the property. If the owners do not do the EPA's bidding, they may
be fined up to $75,000 per day ($37,500 for violating the Act and another
$37,500 for violating the compliance order). And if the owners want their
day in court to show that their lot does not include covered wetlands, well,
as a practical matter, that is just too bad. Until the EPA sues them, they
are blocked from access to the courts, and the EPA may wait as long as it
wants before deciding to sue. By that time, the potential fines may easily
have reached the millions. In a nation that values due process, not to
mention private property, such treatment is unthinkable.74
In Justice Alito’s reasoning, there are strong undertones of a takings analysis. He
continued to analyze the breadth of the CWA jurisdiction that administrators
interpret through reference to Rapanos.75 He then beseeched Congress to address
jurisdictional issues under the CWA.76
Justice Alito’s final thoughts in his concurrence were focused on the concerns of
property owners. In the regime of water quality and control, he noted a significant
amount of ambiguity and uncertainty.77 In this context, Justice Alito only referenced
the CWA—a federal standard for federal agencies.78 But what about even more
expansive state statutes, or other federal water programs? Would Justice Alito’s
attitudes translate to a broader impact? The answer proved a resounding ‘yes’, with
Justice Ginsburg offering caution the entire way.
V. ARKANSAS FISH & GAME: THE WATER RISES IN 2013 WITH THE NEW ATTITUDE
TOWARD TAKINGS
Observers have noted a strong push by property owners—in litigation and
advocacy—to thwart the actions of environmentalist and/or government agency
71

Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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actions impacting private land. Both Rapanos and Sackett were considered
significant victories for private property owners.79 The year 2013 may stand as the
year of the private property owner in modern Supreme Court history.
Though technically decided on December 4, 2012, Arkansas Fish & Game
Commission v. U.S. kicked off the year with a victory for property owners.
Interestingly, the property owner who brought the claim also happened to be a state
agency.80 Still, the decision impacts all property owners.
Interestingly, the case arose because the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was
heeding the wishes of private farmers who had requested that the Corps not release
run-off from the Black River onto their lands.81 Instead, the Corps deviated from its
normal plan and ran the water in such a way as to flood state land. The state took
exception and sued for a temporary taking of its land.82 Hunters frequently used this
land—which lost all of its value to the public during these flooding periods and
caused economic damage to the state agency.83 The federal circuit found that there
was no temporary taking for government flooding of lands.84 Critically, the issue
before the Supreme Court was whether a government policy of intentional flooding
could constitute a temporary taking, not whether a taking had occurred—with
specific reference to First English.85
Writing the Opinion of the Court, Justice Ginsburg quickly dispatched the idea
that temporary federal flooding was not a potential taking:
Tellingly, the Government qualifies its defense of the Federal Circuit's
exclusion of flood invasions from temporary takings analysis. It sensibly
acknowledges that a taking might be found where there is a “sufficiently
prolonged series of nominally temporary but substantively identical
deviations.” This concession is in some tension with the categorical rule
adopted by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, once it is recognized that at least
some repeated nonpermanent flooding can amount to a taking of property,
the question presented to us has been essentially answered. Flooding
cases, like other takings cases, should be assessed with reference to the
“particular circumstances of each case,” and not by resorting to blanket
exclusionary rules.86
Because the case at bar was policy-driven, without a specific whole parcel analysis
before the Court, the Penn Central-First English-Tahoe-Sierra analysis applied to
Arkansas Game & Fish. Justice Ginsburg immediately qualified the Opinion to keep
open the issue of whether a government temporary taking required intent—noting
79 See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 908
(2013).
80

Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 512–13 (2012).
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this issue was not addressed at the court of appeals and so the Court could not hear
it.87
Arkansas Fish & Game was another unanimous Opinion of the Court. Like in
Sackett, unanimity was gained through a narrow Opinion. Again, the Court
specifically refused to go down the path of Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan:
For the same reason, we are not equipped to address the bearing, if any, of
Arkansas water-rights law on this case. The determination whether a
taking has occurred includes consideration of the property owner's distinct
investment-backed expectations, a matter often informed by the law in
force in the State in which the property is located. But Arkansas law was
not examined by the Federal Circuit, and therefore is not properly pursued
in this Court.88
So what did the Court decide? The Court ruled “simply and only, that governmentinduced flooding temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption from Takings
Clause inspection.”89 Referencing Tahoe-Sierra, the Court then reaffirmed that time
is a factor in assessing a temporary taking.90 Justice Ginsburg again looked to the
somewhat nebulous Penn Central test for assessing government policies as opposed
to direct government actions. This was similar to her unique concurrence in Sackett,
which attempted to couch the issue purely in a government policy and not the actions
of the government actors.
Reactions to Arkansas Fish & Game were mixed. It was widely acknowledged
that no major step was taken in the realm of takings law.91 However, it was also
noted that the Court had unanimously agreed with property owners—perhaps a
significant outcome.92 But maybe the more significant accomplishment was that the
Court unanimously agreed with property owners in both Sackett and Arkansas Fish
& Game. Both cases involved government actors and water regulation. In both cases,
it proved difficult for the government actors to objectively explain why the actions of
the governments were utterly free from legal challenges and reasonable examination.
Contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s tone in her Concurrence in Sackett and her
Opinion in Arkansas Fish & Game, both cases featured government actors’ actions
in the context of water regulation. After all, the policies challenged in those cases
existed long before those policies were challenged. So, what changed over the years
to alter government attitudes and actions? The explanation may prove as straightforward as physics—for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.93 The
Court, through Justice Stevens, decided Kelo and Tahoe-Sierra to embolden
government administrators. By all appearances, that has led to the aggressive
reactions of property owners in litigation.
87

Id. at 521–22.
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Id. at 522 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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As some like Professor Richard Epstein further argue, government attitudes
toward wetlands and water management create a haven for government abuse and
behavior our society generally abhors:
Yet under the current law, behavior that is unconscionable in the private
sphere seems acceptable to government actors who regard themselves as
wholly unconstrained by any concerns with private property or with
demonstrating the imminence of any potential harms. Further, there is no
noneconomic value that justifies the government beating up small people
by threatening them with overwhelming fines if they dare challenge a
government edict. The government action from start to finish was ugly
and odious and should be condemned by all people on all sides of any
legitimate environmental dispute.94
Whether individual government regulators take their regulations personally, it is
difficult for the average real property owner not to have a strong, personal
connection with any property use dispute.
The Takings Clause has always provided a “psychological lift” to property
owners, if not always an actual remedy in a court.95 Starting at Rapanos, and picking
up significant steam in 2012–2013, property owners have forced the Supreme Court
to define and redefine their rights in the context of water management regulations.96
Furthermore, property owners value an economic analysis of all property issues.97
This often puts them at odds with regulators, who, at least publicly, attribute their
values to ecological motivations. Property owners have created a steady stream of
litigation which always includes either representation or amicus briefs from groups
who traditionally support property owners such as The Cato Institute, The Heritage
Foundation, Institute for Justice, and the Pacific Legal Institute. Again, the
distinction between a “policy” takings analysis and a “parcel” takings analysis is that
Penn Central is problematic if the ultimate goal is to support government regulators.
A clever jurist like Justice Alito will find enough populist support to make a “parcel”
takings analysis easier to win for the property owner.
Why? Because the narrative of CWA regulation and water-related takings is a
frightening one for almost anyone who is not a government regulator. It is a narrative
of government tyranny predicted and reinforced through repetitive litigation. Though
the liberal faction of the Court worries on ecological principle, the conservative
faction of the Court has proven that—in the context of water regulation—
government accountability and objectivity is highly questionable. Maybe
government regulation of water resources is not as aggressive as the recent Supreme
Court cases depict; but perception becomes reality when the Court issues a
significant Opinion.
There is no more Justice Stevens on the Court. He was the leading force of
property owner-government cases, acquiring the ear and signature of Justice
Kennedy in both 2002’s Tahoe-Sierra and 2006’s infamous Kelo. Indeed, the “right
bloc” of the Court has come together on many issues—some would say with
94
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destructive intentions toward precedent-setting decisions.98 Surely, Justice Alito
wrote the Opinion in Koontz using Tahoe-Sierra as a weapon against Justice
Stevens’ interests related to insulating government regulators. But it is fair to say
that the reasoning in Koontz logically builds off the reasoning in Tahoe-Sierra—a
case where Justice Stevens found support from Justice Kennedy. Therefore, this is
more of an example of Justice Alito’s tone and reasoning carrying the day as a leader
on property rights and water regulation issues.
Still, one can understand the concern of liberal jurists because the concepts
presented in Koontz, as foreshadowed in Sackett, cast doubt upon all the motivations
of all government water regulation. Therefore, it is hardly a surprise that the federal
government filed a special amicus brief in Koontz; or that the Pacific Legal
Foundation—the Sacketts’ counsel before the Court a year earlier—represented the
property owner in Koontz.99
VI. JUSTICE ALITO BRINGS THE PRO-PROPERTY OWNERS’ MOMENTUM FULL CIRCLE
IN KOONTZ
In Koontz, Justice Alito laid out the general Penn Central test.100 He listed the
balancing test factors when assessing the government regulation such as “character”
and “economic impact.”101 But as Justice Stevens pointed out in Tahoe-Sierra,
Justice Alito recited that parcel-specific government actions, such as exactions, were
different.102 These government actions are viewed through the lens of Nollan and
Dolan—even Lucas falls into this camp because of Stevens’ Opinion in TahoeSierra.103 As Justice Alito announced, the protections of Nollan and Dolan apply to
any government restriction which does not have a substantial nexus and rough
proportionality to the restricted development.104
With that line of thinking, the Court examined a situation where private
developer Koontz looked to develop the northern 3.7 acres of his 14.9 acre property
outside of Orlando, Florida.105 The southern section of the property featured a small
creek and assorted wetlands. Further, standing water was found in and around the
power lines which bisected the property east to west. There was also a drainage ditch
on the western edge of the property.106 The developer proposed deeding the 11
98
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Id. Justice Alito specifically referenced a point in the record that the land “may be a
suitable habitat for opossums;” even taking a sentence of the Opinion to do so. One has to
wonder what motivated a sentence like this. Perhaps this was a way to mock the alleged
ecological motivations of the regulatory agency. The previous sentence referencing the results
of a wildlife survey appears to indicate an actual appreciation for the inherent ecological
concerns regarding the development. Though, he did state that the wildlife survey found “a
turtle.” This represents a not insignificant question within the current American conservative
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southern acres of the property as a conservation easement to the St. John River
Water Management District—the government water and wetlands regulator for that
region of Florida.107 Because the development would impact land that “draws water
from, drains into, or is placed into the waters of the state” under Fla. Stat. §
373.403(5), the regulator had to approve a permit in order for the project to go
forward.108
The regulator found the easement inadequate. Instead, the regulator offered two
conditions to the developer before the developer granted the permit:
First, the District proposed that petitioner reduce the size of his
development to 1 acre and deed to the District a conservation easement on
the remaining 13.9 acres. To reduce the development area, the District
suggested that petitioner could eliminate the dry-bed pond from his
proposal and instead install a more costly subsurface stormwater
management system beneath the building site. The District also suggested
that petitioner install retaining walls rather than gradually sloping the land
from the building site down to the elevation of the rest of his property to
the south.
In the alternative, the District told petitioner that he could proceed with
the development as proposed, building on 3.7 acres and deeding a
conservation easement to the government on the remainder of the
property, if he also agreed to hire contractors to make improvements to
District-owned land several miles away. Specifically, petitioner could pay
to replace culverts on one parcel or fill in ditches on another. Either of
those projects would have enhanced approximately 50 acres of Districtowned wetlands. When the District asks permit applicants to fund offsite
mitigation work, its policy is never to require any particular offsite
project, and it did not do so here. Instead, the District said that it “would
also favorably consider” alternatives to its suggested offsite mitigation
projects if petitioner proposed something “equivalent.”109
The Florida District Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit sided with the developer in
the ensuing litigation—finding that the regulator had unlawfully imposed upon the
developer’s land based upon Nollan and Dolan. However, the Florida Supreme
Court sided with the regulator.110 Justice Alito’s unmistakable tone toward water
resource regulators shone through again in his analysis of the procedural history:
The Florida Supreme Court blessed this maneuver and thus effectively
interred those important decisions. Because we conclude that Nollan and

ethos—how seriously to take conservation efforts as balanced against property rights
concerns? In this sense, Justice Alito’s rule may actually force proportionality between
development and conservation—only with public dollars.
107
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Dolan cannot be evaded in this way, the Florida Supreme Court's decision
must be reversed.111
The regulator relied on the long-standing law in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In short, the regulator argued that the developer should
tolerate the cost of good land use policy.112 But Justice Alito instructed that Village
of Euclid is tempered through the realities explored in Nollan and Dolan. In short,
the government regulator had to show that there was a substantial nexus and rough
proportionality between the development and the regulator’s demands.113
The Supreme Court found no substantial nexus or rough proportionality between
developing Koontz’s small wetland parcel and paying money to improve the
completely distinct parcel which the regulator owned. This was decided even though
no land was necessarily taken, but rather that it could have been taken if the
regulator was not challenged.114 Then Justice Alito hit on a fascinating point that
may have many implications. He notes that the regulator is correct to say that
offering to only develop one acre of the land was not a taking under Nollan and
Dolan.115 However, the act of offering the unsupported mitigation in exchange for
2.7 more developable acres was a taking under Nollan and Dolan. Therefore, only
2.7 acres were taken because 1 acre could have proven a reasonable outcome. It was
the overreaching act of the water and wetland regulator that caused the taking.116
Justice Alito’s reasoning appears to bring Nollan, Dolan, and the whole parcel
theory in Penn Coal into close proximity. The whole taken parcel is that which is
encumbered by an unreasonable condition, even if the taken property is overlaid by
untaken property. Again, it is the step too far from the water regulator that brought
the wrath of the Court. The law itself was not unreasonable, having existed since
1972—the very year Koontz purchased the property in question.117 Nollan was a
1987 case Dolan from 1994. What changed? Was it an attitude in society, an attitude
in the Court, or both?
Perhaps Justice Stevens believed in the decency of regulation juxtaposed against
the arbitrary whims of private property owners. He extolled the values of planning
and the collective community interest in Kelo. He added a layer of environmental
concerns in Tahoe-Sierra. Since Justice Stevens’ retirement, his successors lack the
dynamic ability to rally a majority to his view in this area of the law. Yet when you
read the facts of Sackett, Arkansas Fish & Game, and Koontz, where are the
sympathetic facts for the regulator? The sympathy is nowhere in the facts of these
recent cases. The regulator is “in the wrong” in the court of law and the court of
public opinion. But is this because the regulator’s policy is inherently unjust?
Absolutely not. Rather, the vitriol toward water and wetlands regulators comes from
111 Id. at 2591 (emphasis added). One would expect no less in terms of creative criticism
from someone who “corrected” the President of the United States during the State of Union.
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the mutually connected concepts that: (1) regulators want to make a true difference
in water quality; and (2) they insist that it is the landowner who exclusively must pay
in order to achieve that goal.
The process environmental regulators, particularly water quality regulators, use
with landowners is a system of exactions which many consider unjustifiable, and “an
absolute abuse of government power.”118 Again, Professor Epstein frames the issue
very well when he states:
The recent case of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District
comes to mind. That case tried to get around the notion that the state must
pay for what it wants to take by inventing a very large notion of “harm,”
and then announcing that some duty of environmental mitigation shall be
imposed upon all landowners who have the temerity to want to build on
their own land without creating a nuisance to anybody. The performance
on every side of this particular argument was lamentably incompetent in
terms of the way in which it was organized.
At the beginning of oral argument, Justice Sotomayor and Justice
Ginsburg asked bluntly if the plaintiff wished to challenge the doctrine of
environmental mitigation, to which the lawyer said no. That was the first
mistake. What the lawyer should have said is, “Yes, there is no more
pernicious doctrine in the entire armory of environmental law than that
one because it upsets the proper relationship of private property to the
state.” What is the danger in this case? It lies in the ad hoc view that the
government somehow owns an environmental easement over all property,
which it will waive only if private individuals engage in acts of
environmental mitigation.119
From a policy standpoint, this is what regulators might take away from this case: pay
for what you want like everyone else.120 This entire analysis of the attitudes and
boldness of water quality regulators has ultimately become an issue of cost. Why?
Because the issue of water regulation is, to the landowner, an economic one. The
sustainability and quality of water resources are societal demands, and yet society—
as represented through the actions of the regulators in Koontz—believes that it is not
society’s responsibility to shoulder the burden. Instead, society can pay regulators to
force landowners to spend significantly more than the regulator’s salary. It is a netpositive investment for the regulatory unit; it is also wildly unfair government
activity which is guarded against under the Constitution. From a public policy
standpoint, wetlands mitigation as displayed in Koontz is also inappropriate because
it misses the point of mass sustainability—the commitment of the masses.
The economic analysis of Justice Alito’s Opinion in Koontz is probably the most
broad and impactful take away—even strictly monetary exactions, whether for the
improvement of public or private land, “must satisfy the nexus and rough
proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.”121 Because money and
118
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regulations are omnipresent in land development, especially near water, it stands to
reason that the Nollan and Dolan test will be applied to many more local, state, and
federal government regulations. As applied, the legal analysis will shine a bright,
revealing light on the government actor’s underlying policy goals for a regulation
and whether those goals are applied in a way that establishes a substantial nexus and
rough proportionality—even when the regulation is a condition to obtaining a
permit. Indeed, Justice Alito’s Opinion seems to reinforce the legal maxim that the
law will not tolerate such evasions of its power.
Professor Epstein, again, certainly supports this line of thinking as the proper
solution to the problem of preserving ecological treasures:
The only way the law achieves this end is to demand that the government
unbundle the development rights from the exaction and thereby insist that
the state pay for what it wants. The Koontz situation is another illustration
of government cheap talk; if the Management Board had to pay to take
over these development rights, it would have resorted to general tax
revenues to finance its purchase of the development rights.122
Broken down to its bare bones, wetlands mitigation is an economic proposition.
Many times, the response to regulation is that the cost is passed on to the consumer.
In turn, society then has to pay more and somehow this balances out the property
owner’s extra expense. But that thinking is faulty in the context of wetlands and
water quality. For instance, if a more expensive window is required on a new
building due to regulations, then that cost might be factored into the cost of leasing
that building. However, the building is still leased; in theory, the occupant benefits
directly from the expensive window. Therefore, the owner can pass along the cost of
the expensive window.
This is not true when deciding whether a developer can even develop certain
parts of land. When faced with the coercive choice to develop 3.7 as opposed to 1
acre of land, having 1 acre of developable land does not make the property more
profitable than if 3.7 acres were developed. A developer cannot turn around and say
to a potential occupant I will charge you 3.7 times a marketable lease rate because
you are benefitting from my not developing the surrounding 2.7 acres—especially
when the surrounding dozen acres are undeveloped. That potential occupant would
likely think the developer was insane. Instead, the benefit of not developing the 2.7acre remainder lies with the community as a whole. Therefore, it logically follows
that the community should pay the cost of not developing this land.
This new attitude may force difficult, but critical, community land acquisition
decisions. Perhaps this type of attitude would stimulate more cooperative processes
leading to development agreements of land donations in exchange for tax write-offs.
Rather than start a conflict over a potential taking, or seek significant public funding
to create riparian buffers, property owners and governments could work together
toward a mutually positive economic and ecological outcome. Koontz has the
potential to usher in a new era or property owner rights, but will it?
VII. CONCLUSION
That is the question which lingers over Koontz—does it actually mean anything
for communities and local regulators? What practical conclusions can we draw from
122
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the Opinion? Here is what we do know: (1) Nollan and Dolan apply whether a
permit is denied or approved with conditions; and (2) there is no substantial
distinction between a physical government invasion and a coercive request for funds,
if the government action fails under Nollan and Dolan.123 Clearly, there is a newlyrecognized risk to water resource regulators who try to stop development in areas
which are considered wetlands.
Still, why develop most or any of those areas at all? Consider the case of New
Jersey’s reaction to Hurricane Sandy.124 The State reacted to this crisis by creating
programs which encourage individuals to relocate buildings further from regulated
waters and requiring buildings to be constructed at higher elevations—there was
even assistance for the purchase of unusable property.125 The decision to set aside
wetlands as ecological treasures is a decision best left to the locals who would gain
use from the land. Local, state, and federal programs already exists to buyout houses
in floodplains and restore the areas to lush wetlands.126 If we are in an environmental
crisis, then why not take the same approach with private property designated as
precious wetlands?
If Mr. & Mrs. Deaton dig a ditch in Maryland, is that really a risk to the health
of the environment, or is it a risk to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ sense of
jurisdictional pride because the Deatons never asked permission?127 If the Sacketts
build their dream home, does it really help the environment to recreate a wetland
after it is already filled? Is it just for the Sacketts to be punished with millions of
dollars in fines while they assert they have done no wrong? These actions create the
perception that water resource regulators are worried about their own power and
ability to exert influence, with environmental concerns a secondary consideration.
That attitude is what gave rise to a unanimous Opinion in Sackett. Arkansas Fish &
Game was a next step which confirmed the policy-versus-parcel distinction in
takings law.
The Opinion in Koontz may cause exactly what Justice Stevens feared in First
English and Tahoe-Sierra—that developers would flood administrators with
challenges and litigation.128 In the ultimate irony, it was Justice Stevens’ Opinion in
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Tahoe-Sierra which may well have contributed to the facts in cases like Sackett and
Koontz. When these opportunities arose, Justice Alito did exactly what he was put on
the Court to accomplish—offer a voice for property owners after a decade of abusing
property rights. Justice Alito’s voice took Tahoe-Sierra to its logical result, creating
a potential era of positive results for property developers. We might have seen this
coming in Sackett, which, oddly-enough, was not cited in Koontz. There is little
doubt that the CWA itself could be impacted by this decision. But the real loser in
this situation is the water resource regulator, and that was the strength of Justice
Alito’s voice all along.
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